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The doctrine of autonomy is one of the foundation stones of the
law of letters of credit. Under this doctrine, the obligation of an is-
suing bank of a letter of credit is independent from the underlying
sale of goods contract for which the credit will provide payment.
An exception to this doctrine may arise in a case of fraud.
Under the fraud rule, although the documents presented may
comply strictly on their face with the terms and conditions of the
letter of credit, payment under the credit may be stopped if fraud
is found to have been committed before payment is made, pro-
vided the presenter or party demanding payment does not belong
to a protected class.
The policy tension behind the fraud rule was well expressed by
Justice Le Dain in the leading Canadian case of Bank of Nova Scotia
v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd., in these terms:
The potential scope of the fraud exception must not be a
means of creating serious uncertainty and lack of confi-
dence in the operation of letter of credit transactions; at the
same time the application of the principle of autonomy
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must not serve to encourage or facilitate fraud in such
transactions.'
The fraud rule allows an issuer or a court to view the facts be-
hind the face of conforming documents and to halt the payment of
a letter of credit when fraud is involved. The raison d'etre of letters
of credit is to provide an absolute assurance of payment to a seller,
provided the seller presents the right documents. The fraud rule
thus goes to the very heart of the letter of credit obligation and has
been described as "the most controversial and confused area" in
the law governing letters of credit.
2
Why, then, is it necessary to have such a rule? There are at
least three reasons: (1) to close a loophole in the law; (2) to uphold
the public policy of limiting fraud; and (3) to maintain the com-
mercial utility of letters of credit. Each will be considered.
1. CLOSING A LOOPHOLE
In accordance with the principle of autonomy, all parties under
a letter of credit arrangement are dealing in documents, not the
goods or services to which the documents relate. If the documents
tendered appear on their face to be in strict compliance with the
terms and conditions stipulated in the credit, the issuer must make
the payment, irrespective of any disputes or claims with regard to
other related transactions. The issuer is entitled to full recourse
against the applicant, even if the documents received turn out to be
forgeries or include fraudulent statements. The issuer's only duty
is to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the documents ten-
dered comply on their face with the terms and conditions of the
credit. This doctrine normally serves commerce well and facilitates
the commercial utility of letters of credit.
However, "[a]s is the case with any rule that paints human
conduct with a broad brush, an overly rigid application" of the
autonomy principle may in some cases produce harsh results,
which can undermine the original purpose of the principle.3 This
happens when fraud is involved in the transaction. Because of the
1 [1987] D.L.R. 161,168 (Can.).
2 Note, "Fraud in the Transaction": Enjoining Letters of Credit During the Iranian
Revolution, 93 HARV. L. REv. 992, 995 (1980).
3 Herbert A. Getz, Comment, Enjoining the International Standby Letter of
Credit: The Iranian Letter of Credit Cases, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 189, 204 (1980).
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document-oriented nature of the letter of credit operation, benefi-
ciaries demanding payment do not have to show that they have
properly performed their duties in the underlying transaction; they
need only produce conforming documents. The separation in law
of the documents from the actual performance of the underlying
transaction is absolutely necessary for credits to fulfill their essen-
tial commercial function and creates a loophole for unscrupulous
beneficiaries to abuse the system. Perpetrators of fraud ("Fraud-
sters") may thus utilize letters of credit to obtain others' money by
presenting forged or fraudulent documents. The classic example is
where the seller gets paid under a letter of credit by presenting
forged documents that comply in form with the requirements in
the credit, yet the buyer receives only a shipment of worthless rub-
bish instead of the expected goods. With the fraud rule in place,
this loophole in the letter of credit system has shrunk: even if
every injustice fraud can cause is not prevented, its effects are at
least minimized.
2. PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE CONTROL OF FRAUD
The fraud rule fills a gap in the law of letters of credit and a
public policy requirement. As an American judge has stated,
"[T]here is as much public interest in discouraging fraud as in en-
couraging the use of letters of credit."4 Thus the fraud rule is part
of a sound legal system that upholds the public policy of limiting
fraud.
This policy needs more emphasis than ever in our age. In re-
cent years, letters of credit and independent guarantees have in-
creasingly been used by fraudsters as instruments of "a particu-
larly vicious scam which has bilked investors out of millions of
dollars not to mention uncounted hours and costs, has spurred
numerous law suits, criminal investigations, and sullied the repu-
tation of legitimate vehicles of trade and commercial finance."'S If
4 Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. Citizens & S. Natl Bank, 356 F. Supp. 991, 1000
(N.D. Ga. 1973) (Edenfield, J.).
5 James Byrne, Critical Issues in the International and Domestic Harmonisation of
Letter of Credit Law and Practice, in COMERaCIAL LAW ANNUAL 389, 421 (1995). For a
series of articles and reports on these scams, see id. at 421 n.47. See also ICC
COMMERCIAL CRIME BUREAU, SPEcIAL REPORT: PRIME BANK INSTUMENT FRAUDS
(1994) [hereinafter PRIME BANK INSTRUMENT FRAuDs]; ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME
BUREAU, SPECIAL REPORT: PRIME BANK INSTRUMENT FRAUDs 11 (1996) [hereinafter
PRIME BANK INSTRuMENT FRAuDS II].
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the law takes a strong stand against fraud, prospective fraudsters
may be deterred from perpetrating their dishonest deeds.
3. MAINTAINING THE UTILITY OF LETTERS OF CREDIT
Fraud in the letter of credit not only violates the public policy
against fraud, but also poses "an equally serious potential threat to
the commercial utility of letters of credit."6 The popularity of the
letter of credit lies in the fact that it provides a fair balance of com-
peting interests among the parties involved. The normal operation
of the letter of credit not only provides the beneficiary with safe
and rapid access to the purchase price or a sum of money when the
applicant defaults, but also provides the applicant with credit
and/or other commercial benefits, protects the applicant against
improper calls on the credit by requiring the beneficiary to present
documents indicating that it has properly performed its obligations
under the underlying transaction, and most importantly, assists the
applicant to realize its commercial goal. It also furnishes the issuer
with a fee for its ministerial document checking service.
If one party avails itself of the loophole in the letter of credit
system and defrauds other interested parties by presenting forged
or fraudulent documents, their action harms the interests of the
other parties and undermines the balance assumed in the letter of
credit scheme. In a commercial letter of credit transaction, for ex-
ample, if the seller ships nothing or only rubbish, but gets paid by
tendering forged or fraudulent documents, it hurts the applicant.
It might be argued that, under the law of letters of credit, the buyer
may proceed against the seller for fraud under the underlying con-
tract, but this is generally not an attractive proposition. In most of
the cases, the fraudster "absconds before the fraud or forgery is
discovered." 7 Where that is so, the seller's fraudulent conduct may
also impair the interests of the issuer. Often the bank agrees to is-
sue the letter of credit on the condition that the goods will serve as
security for its honor of the letter of credit. If nothing or only rub-
6 Guy W. Lewin Smith, Irrevocable Letters of Credit and Third Party Fraud: The
American Accord, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 55, 96 (1983).
7 Peter Ellinger, Documentary Credits and Fraudulent Documents, in CURRENT
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANCING 185, 191 (C. M. Chinkin et al. eds.,
1983).
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bish is shipped, the issuer's security interest over the goods fails as
well.
8
As with any commercial vehicle, the popularity of the letter of
credit is based on the faith of its users. If the possibility of the
abuse of the letter of credit system is not curtailed, and fraud flour-
ishes, faith in the system of letters of credit will fade, as will the
commercial utility of the letter of credit. As explained by Boris Ko-
zolchyk:
The certainty of payment of a letter of credit is crucial for
those who, as beneficiaries, supply their money, goods or
services to applicants.... Yet what about the applicant? To
leave the applicant without a remedy against fraud would
equally frustrate the applicant's expectations of the letter of
credit. After all, why should a good faith applicant agree to
procure the issuance of a letter of credit and reimburse the
issuing bank if the letter of credit becomes an automatic
and unstoppable vehicle for the perpetration of fraud? As
is true with other commercial legal institutions, an ap-
proach that favors one party at the expense of the other un-
dermines the viability of the institution.9
With the fraud rule limiting fraudsters from abusing the letter
of credit system, honest letter of credit users will be more comfort-
able using it. Thus the fraud rule also helps to maintain the com-
mercial utility of the letter of credit.
8 In practice, the issuer often takes general security over the applicant's other
assets as well as particular security over the goods, so its risk is much less than the
applicant's. However, if fraud is involved and the applicant cannot receive the
goods, the issuer's risk clearly increases. Fraud can also damage the issuer's in-
terests in other ways. For example, as explained by Christopher Sparks, "'Banks,
and bankers, rely upon their reputation and standing-in the eyes of both the
public and supervisors; a high reputation is hard won, but much more easily lost.'
Fraud - internally and externally, is undoubtedly 'THE' enemy which threatens
the stability of the international banking community." PRIME BANK INSTRUMENT
FRAUDS, supra note 5, at 40 (emphasis in original).
9 Boris Kozolchyk, The Immunization of Fraudulently Procured Letter of Credit
Acceptances: All Services Exportacao, Importacao Comercio, S.A. v. Banco Bamer-
indus do Brazil S.A. and First Commercial v. Gotham Originals, 58 BROOK. L. REv.
369, 370 (1992). For comments to similar effect, see also Byrne, supra note 5, at 397
("If the credit becomes a vehicle unduly favouring one side or another, it will lose
its primary attraction as a balanced safeguard for both interests of applicant and
beneficiary.").
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4. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
To understand the fraud rule today and the development that
is still needed for it to become a fully effective commercial law, one
must understand where it has come from and how it has grown.
4.1. An Early Case
It is not easy to trace the exact time when fraud became an is-
sue in the law governing letters of credit, but "[t]he idea that fraud
upsets the usual rules of credits is an old one."' 0 In Pillans v. Van
Mierop, a 1765 English case, White, a merchant in Ireland, desired
to draw upon the plaintiffs, Pillans and Rose, merchants in Hol-
land, for a sum of money." As the condition of their accepting the
bill, Pillans and Rose desired a confirmed credit upon a good
house in London for their reimbursement. White named the house
of the defendants, Van Mireop and Hopkins. Both White and the
plaintiffs wrote to them asking whether they would agree with the
arrangement, and the defendants did. However, when the plain-
tiffs drew on the defendants, they refused to honor the plaintiffs'
bills, because White had become insolvent.
On trial, a verdict was found for the defendants. On appeal,
the defendants first argued that their promise to the plaintiffs was
a void undertaking as the consideration under the transaction was
not appropriate. This argument was rejected by Lord Mansfield on
the ground that the transaction was a commercial one. However,
the respected judge at the same time observed that the defendants'
refusal to honor payment could have been justified if fraud had
been involved in the transaction, stating, "I was then of opinion,
that Van Mierop and Hopkins were bound by their letter; unless
there was some fraud upon them: for that they had engaged under
their hands, in a mercantile action, 'to give credit for Pillans and
Rose's reimbursement. '"
12
Following Lord Mansfield's observation, the defendants added
to their argument that "this transaction was fraudulently con-
cealed,. . . both by White and the plaintiffs, from the defendants."
13
10 JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETTERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL AND STANDBY
CREDrrS 7.03[1] n.22 (rev. ed. 1996).
11 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
12 Id. at 1035-36.
13 Id. at 1037.
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However, Lord Mansfield repudiated the defendants' supplemen-
tary argument and said:
If there was any kind of fraud in this transaction, the collu-
sion and mala fides would have vacated the [the letter of
credit]. But from these letters it seems to me clear, that
there was none .... Both the plaintiffs and White wrote to
Van Mierop and Company. They answered "that they
would honour the plaintiffs' draughts." So that the defen-
dants assent to the proposal made by White, and ratify it.
And it does not seem at all that the plaintiffs then doubted
of White's sufficiency, or meant to conceal any thing from
the defendants.14
Pillans was a case decided over two hundred years ago, at a
time when the letter of credit was still in the early stages of devel-
opment. It was mainly litigated and adjudicated as a case of con-
tract, and the fraud rule was not explored in any detail. However,
the case sent one clear message: fraudulent conduct would not be
tolerated by the law of letters of credit. Pillans planted the seed of
the fraud rule at a time when letters of credit were barely born.
4.2. Fraud Cases in the Early 20th Century
The earliest case in relation to letter of credit fraud in more re-
cent times is the oft-mentioned Higgins v. Steinhardter,15 a 1919 U.S.
case. In Higgins, a letter of credit was to be used to pay for a ship-
ment of walnuts to be shipped on or before November 7,1918. The
plaintiff purchasers, brought an action to restrain the beneficiaries,
the sellers, from collection, and the issuer, Monroe & Co, from
payment of the moneys called for in the letter of credit, and for the
cancellation of the credit, upon the ground that the beneficiar-
ies/sellers had defaulted on the contract in that the walnuts were
not shipped until December 1918. The plaintiffs further alleged
that the sellers had procured the bill of lading falsely, stating that
the shipment was made on October 30, 1918, and that the issuer,
although notified of the said facts, had affirmed that upon presen-
tation of drafts accompanied by facially conforming bills of lading
14 Id. at 1038.
15 175 N.Y.S. 279 (1919).
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it would accept and pay the same. The court granted the injunc-
tion saying:
It is clear that the plaintiff authorized a credit to apply only
to a shipment made on or before November 7th, and hence,
if shipment was made subsequent to that date, a payment
made against said credit would be unauthorized. It became
an unused credit, canceled by limitation of time.
16
During the litigation, the issuer argued that it might have be-
come obliged to pay drafts drawn against the said credit in any
event because of the transfer of such drafts to third parties. How-
ever, the court rejected the issuer's argument and stated:
[A]s before stated, plaintiffs authorized payment only on
account of a shipment made by a certain date. If defendant
Monroe & Co's agent accepted in proof of such shipment a
bill of lading which was in fact false as to the time of ship-
ment, then such act of defendants' agent is proximate cause
of any risk of loss by the issuance of drafts against the said
credit.17
Higgins was litigated and decided shortly after World War I, a
time when letters of credit were developing into their modem
form. In this case, the fact that the bill of lading was found to have
been fraudulently predated could have been a clear ground for the
plaintiffs' pleadings, but neither the plaintiffs nor the court pur-
sued the case in accordance with the fraud rule.
Although the plaintiffs mentioned in their complaint that the
bill of lading presented contained a false statement about the date
of shipment, it seems that they did so merely as a matter of fact,
not as a cause of action, since their main argument was that the
sellers had defaulted on the contract; they did not sue the sellers
for fraud. As for the court, although the factual basis for its deci-
sion was the sellers' fraudulent predating of the bill of lading, the
court did not base its decision on the fraud rule, but justified its
16 Id. at 280 (citations omitted).
17 Id. For criticism of the decision, see Note, Commercial Letters of Credit, 21
COLUM. L. REV. 176, 179-81 (1921).
[23:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss4/2
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FRAUD RULE
judgment on another legal basis: payment against a bill of lading
with a false statement would be "unauthorized." When the court
rejected the issuer's argument that it might have to pay innocent
third parties involved, it ignored one important element of today's
fraud rule: the protection of innocent third parties.
Because of the pleading and the reasoning of Higgins, it may be
safe to say that the fraud rule in the law of letters of credit was so
embryonic at that time in the United States that even people in fi-
nancial centers like New York did not contemplate its relevance.I8
Although it was clear enough that the discovery of fraud under the
letter of credit transaction was not tolerable, neither the victim nor
the court used the fraud rule to fight fraud. They found another
route to meet that end.
Another case related to the development of the fraud rule in
the early 20th Century is Societe Metallurgique D'Aubrives & Vil-
lerupt v. British Bank for Foreign Trade,19 an English case of 1922. In
this case, the plaintiffs sold pig iron to a Mr. Ford, and payment
was to be made by way of a letter of credit. The defendant/issuer
paid the price of the first consignment but later, on instructions
from the buyer, refused to pay on presentation of further docu-
ments, asserting that the pig iron was not of the quality contracted
for. The sellers brought an action against the issuer, claiming
damages for breach of contract. In defense the issuer added to its
earlier assertion that the goods were not up to contracted quality,
the argument that the documents presented were not in order. But
Justice Bailhache of the King's Bench Division rejected both these
arguments and gave judgment for the sellers. Considering quality
of goods issue, the judge in dicta mentioned the issue of fraud and
observed:
But there was a good deal of evidence given as to the actual
quality of the iron, and in any action against a bank for fail-
ure to honour credit for goods which are not in order the
question of quality only comes in on one or other of two
ways. First of all, did the person presenting misdescribe
the goods in such a way as to be guilty of fraud. If that
18 This case reveals, further, that the law of letters of credit as a whole was
less developed at that time, in as much as the parties treated their dispute as a de-
fault of contract.
19 11 Lloyd's List L. Rep. 168 (K.B. 1922).
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were so, then the bank in refusing to pay would be justified.
But nothing of that sort is suggested in this case.
20
Unlike Higgins, Societe Metallurgique was a case where fraud
neither existed nor was alleged. The dispute in Societe Metallur-
gique was over whether goods were of the contracted quality and
whether the documents presented were in order. However, the
statement of Justice Bailhache indicates that the court might have
been prepared to step in and interfere with the payment of the let-
ter of credit had fraud been found to have been committed in the
transaction. This was in agreement with the English position ex-
pressed by Lord Mansfield in Pillans. But what remains unclear is
how the court would have formulated its judgment had fraud been
found in the case: would its reasoning have been like that of the
U.S. court in Higgins or would its judgment have been based on the
fraud rule as we understand it today?
The view that fraud might disturb the normal payment of a let-
ter of credit was echoed in at least two other U.S. cases in the 1920s.
One is Old Colony Trust Co. v. Lawyers' Title & Trust Co., where the
plaintiffs had advanced large sums to a sugar seller and received a
letter of credit issued by the defendant as security. 21 The letter of
credit required that drafts should be drawn only against "net
landed weights," must be made prior to November 30, 1920, and
must be accompanied by negotiable delivery orders or warehouse
receipts. Net landed weight could be ascertained only after the
goods had been landed and weighed by customs officials to de-
termine the duty payable on the importation, and warehouse re-
ceipts could not be issued until the goods were in the actual pos-
session of the warehouseman. All shipments did not, in fact, clear
customs until December 3, 1920 at the earliest, but drafts accompa-
nied by facially compliant documents were presented for payment
prior to the expiration date of the letter of credit. The defendant
refused to honor the drafts on the basis that the documents were
not in conformity with the letter of credit. The plaintiffs sued to
recover damages for the defendant's breach of contract, but the
trial court rejected the claim. 22 On appeal, the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the original judgment and noted:
20 Id. at 170.
21 297 F. 152 (2d Cir. 1924).
22 Id. at 153.
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The invoices in triplicate presented with the drafts each
stated so many lbs. "net at 201/c. net landed weights duty
paid New York."
As this statement was false, there was failure of compliance
with the letter of credit....
Obviously, when the issuer of a letter of credit knows that a
document, although correct in form, is, in point of fact, false
or illegal, he cannot be called upon to recognize such a
document as complying with the terms of a letter of
credit.23
The case of Old Colony is similar to Higgins in many ways. In
both cases, there were fraudulent documents, the parties litigated
on the basis of breach of contract, and the courts allowed interrup-
tion of payment under letters of credit because of fraud. The major
distinction is that the courts based their judgments on different
grounds: the court in Higgins reasoned that payment against a
fraudulent bill of lading would be "unauthorized"; the court of Old
Colony grounded its judgment on the basis that fraudulent docu-
ments could not be considered as complying documents. How-
ever, neither of the courts used the fraud rule as an independent
weapon for fighting fraud.
Another case is Maurice O'Meara Co. v. National Park Bank, in
which the underlying contract was for the sale of newsprint paper
of a specified tensile strength.24 When the plaintiff presented fa-
cially regular documents and required payment against the letter
of credit, the defendant bank, the issuer, refused to pay the drafts,
claiming that "[tihere has arisen a reasonable doubt regarding the
quality of the newsprint paper."25 The plaintiff, the beneficiary,
23 Id. at 156, 158.
24 146 N.E. 636 (N.Y. 1925) (McLaughlin, J.) (Cardozo & Crane, JJ., dissent-
ing). For special comments on the case, see Recent Decisions, Banks and Banking-
Letters of Credit -Defences Available to Bank, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 829 (1925); Com-
ment, The Rights of the Seller Under a Documentary Letter of Credit, 34 YALE L.J. 775,
777 (1925); and Note, Banks and Banking - Letters of Credit - Issuing Bank's Liability,
9 MINN. L. REv. 657, 659 (1925).
25 Maurice O'Meara Co., 146 N.E. at 639.
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brought the action against the issuer for damages sustained by its
assignor from the issuer's refusal to honor the letter of credit. The
issuer defended against the beneficiary's action on the ground that
the quality of the paper fell far short of that required. The majority
judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York rejected the issuing
bank's defense and said:
The bank was concerned only in the drafts and the docu-
ments accompanying them.... If the drafts, when pre-
sented, were accompanied by the proper documents, then it
was absolutely bound to make the payment under the letter
of credit, irrespective of whether it knew, or had reason to
believe, that the paper was not of the tensile strength con-
tracted for.
To hold otherwise is to read into the letter of credit some-
thing which is not there, and this the court ought not to do,
since it would impose upon a bank a duty which in many
cases would defeat the primary purpose of such letters of
credit.2
6
However, Justice Cardozo disagreed with the majority judg-
ment. After affirming the general rule that the issuing bank had no
duty to investigate the performance of the underlying contract, the
respected judge observed:
I dissent from the view that, if [the bank] chooses to inves-
tigate and discovers thereby that the merchandise tendered
is not in truth the merchandise which the documents de-
scribe, it may be forced by the delinquent seller to make
payment of the price irrespective of its knowledge. We are
to bear in mind that this controversy is not one between the
bank on the one side and on the other a holder of the drafts
who has taken them without notice and for value. The con-
troversy arises between the bank and a seller who has mis-
26 Id.
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represented the security upon which advances are de-
manded. Between parties so situated payment may be re-
sisted if the documents are false.... I think we lose sight of
the true nature of the transaction when we view the bank as
acting upon the credit of its customer to the exclusion of all
else. It acts not merely upon the credit of its customer, but
upon the credit also of the merchandise which is to be ten-
dered as security.... I cannot accept the statement of the
majority opinion that the bank was not concerned with any
question as to the character of the paper. If that is so, the
bales tendered might have been rags instead of paper, and
still the bank would have been helpless, though it had
knowledge of the truth, if the documents tendered by the
seller were sufficient on their face.
27
Compared with the cases so far discussed, the reasoning of
Maurice O'Meara is much more sophisticated, and the effect of it is
more significant for the development of the fraud rule. First, in his
dissenting judgment, Justice Cardozo was not only of the view that
"payment may be resisted if the documents are false" under a let-
ter of credit arrangement, but also considered the interest of inno-
cent third parties, or "a holder of the drafts who has taken them
without notice and for value," and the issuer's security interest in
the goods represented by the documents. 28 Second, Maurice
O'Meara was both litigated and decided on the basis of the law of
letters of credit, and not, as with other cases, handled as a case of
contract. Finally, looking at the majority opinion and the dissent-
ing opinion of Justice Cardozo together, the reasoning of Maurice
O'Meara is very similar to the reasoning of a modern letter of credit
fraud case, where the court normally first emphasizes the signifi-
cance of the principle of independence and then sets forth the ele-
ments of the fraud rule and applies them.
27 Id. at 641. For a criticism of the dissenting view, see Rights of the Seller, su-
pra note 24, at 781. But cf. Banks and Banking, supra note 24, at 658 (arguing that
"under certain circumstances the term of the sales contract may be relied on by
the bank to limit or avoid its liability").
28 Id.
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4.3. Commentary
The phenomenon of fraud is "timeless and universal." 29 So are
efforts for the control of fraud. Therefore, the issue of the fraud
rule in the law of letters of credit was raised as early as the 1760s.
However, as this short survey of cases has revealed, the fraud rule
was not well developed even by the 1920s, as is illustrated by the
fact that none of the cases surveyed was pleaded or adjudicated ac-
cording to the fraud rule. It appears that parties were not aware of
the fraud rule or accustomed to using it to advance their cases at
that time. This, in particular, is shown by the cases of Higgins and
Old Colony.
Nonetheless, one point is clear enough in all of the cases, if only
through dicta: the documents tendered by the beneficiary under a
letter of credit had to be both genuine and honest, and the issuer
accordingly could not be forced to take documents that it knew to
be false or fraudulent. Or, in the words of Finkelstein: "At any
rate, the legal principle is clear. Where the bank can show that the
seller has acted fraudulently, it is under no duty to pay the
seller." 30 Combining this basic point with the elements listed in
Justice Cardozo's dissenting judgment in Maurice O'Meara, it might
safely be submitted that almost all the bricks and mortar for the
building of the fraud rule were assembled by the time of the deci-
sion of Maurice O'Meara: all that was needed was a case like Sztejn
v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp. to help to build the structure. 31
5. THE CATALYST - THE SZTEIN CASE
Sztejn is the landmark case in the course of the development of
the fraud rule in the law of letters of credit. It has not only been
codified in the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") and followed
by nearly all subsequent letter of credit fraud cases in the United
States, but it has also been cited with approval or followed
throughout the common law world. Because of its significance,
special treatment of the case is warranted.
29 L. H. LEIGH, THE CONTROL OF COMMERCIAL FRAUD 3 (1982).
30 HERMAN N. FINKELSTEIN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF COMMERCIAL LETTERS OF CREDIT
248 (1930).
31 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Special Term 1941).
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5.1. The Facts
Sztejn contracted to buy bristles from Transea Traders Ltd., an
Indian company. In order to pay for the goods, Sztejn asked
Schroder to issue a letter of credit in favor of Transea. Transea
placed fifty cases of material on board a steamship, procured the
documents required by the letter of credit, and drew a draft to the
order of Chartered Bank, which presented the draft to Schroder for
payment along with the required documents. Before payment had
been made, Sztejn filed a suit for a judgment declaring the letter of
credit and draft thereunder void and for injunctive relief to prevent
the issuer from paying the draft, alleging that the beneficiary had,
in fact, "filled the fifty crates with cowhair, other worthless mate-
rial and rubbish with intent to simulate genuine merchandise and
defraud the plaintiff .... "32 The plaintiff also averred that the pre-
senting bank was merely a collecting bank for Transea, not an in-
nocent holder of the draft for value. The presenting bank moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause
of action because "the Chartered Bank is only concerned with the
documents and on their face these conform to the requirements of
the letter of credit."33
5.2. The Judgment
For the purpose of hearing the motion, Justice Shientag as-
sumed that all allegations in the complaint were true, namely, that
"Transea was engaged in a scheme to defraud the plaintiff.. . , that
the merchandise shipped by Transea is worthless rubbish and that
the Chartered Bank is not an innocent holder of the draft for value
but is merely attempting to procure payment of the draft for Tran-
sea's account."34
Based on the "established" fact that fraud had been committed
in the transaction, the Court bluntly rejected the Chartered Bank's
motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and ruled for the plain-
tiff. In reaching his decision, Justice Shientag first acknowledged
the importance of the principle of independence in the law of let-
ters of credit, stating:
32 Id. at 633.
33 Id. at 632.
34 Id. at 633.
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It is well established that a letter of credit is independent of
the primary contract of sale between the buyer and the
seller. The issuing bank agrees to pay upon presentation of
documents, not goods. This rule is necessary to preserve
the efficiency of the letter of credit as an instrument for the
financing of trade. One of the chief purposes of the letter of
credit is to furnish the seller with a ready means of obtain-
ing prompt payment for his merchandise. It would be a
most unfortunate interference with business transactions if
a bank before honoring drafts drawn upon it was obliged or
even allowed to go behind the documents, at the request of
the buyer and enter into controversies between the buyer
and the seller regarding the quality of the merchandise
shipped.35
The judge then succinctly laid down the reasons for deciding in
a way that might have seemed contrary to this principle by saying:
Of course, the application of [the principle of independ-
ence] presupposes that the documents accompanying the
draft are genuine and conform in terms to the requirements
of the letter of credit .... However, I believe that a differ-
ent situation is presented in the instant action. This is not a
controversy between the buyer and seller concerning a
mere breach of warranty regarding the quality of the mer-
chandise; on the present motion, it must be assumed that
the seller has intentionally failed to ship any goods ordered
by the buyer. In such a situation, where the seller's fraud
has been called to the bank's attention before the drafts and
documents have been presented for payment, the principle of
the independence of the bank's obligation under the letter of credit
should not be extended to protect the unscrupulous seller....
Although our courts have used broad language to the effect
that a letter of credit is independent of the primary contract
between the buyer and seller, that language was used in
cases concerning alleged breaches of warranty; no case has
35 Id.
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been brought to my attention on this point involving an in-
tentional fraud on the part of the seller which was brought
to the bank's notice with the request that it withhold pay-
ment of the draft on this account.36
In what has come to be a highly regarded judgment, Justice
Shientag not only established the basis upon which the payment
under the letter of credit in the case should be stopped, but also
weighed the interests of the other parties involved in the case: the
issuing bank and the presenting bank. He recognized that the
fraudulent actions of the seller might also work to the detriment of
the issuing bank's security interest. To this later point, he stated:
While the primary factor in the issuance of the letter of
credit is the credit standing of the buyer, the security af-
forded by the merchandise is also taken into account. In
fact, the letter of credit requires a bill of lading made out to
the order of the bank and not the buyer. Although the bank
is not interested in the exact detailed performance of the
sales contract, it is vitally interested in assuring itself that
there are some goods represented by the documents.37
As for the position of the presenting bank, the Chartered Bank,
Justice Shientag observed:
No hardship will be caused by permitting the bank to re-
fuse payment where fraud is claimed, where the merchan-
dise is not merely inferior in quality but consists of worth-
less rubbish, where the draft and the accompanying documents
are in the hands of one who stands in the same position as the
fraudulent seller, where the bank has been given notice of the
fraud before being presented with the drafts and docu-
ments for payment, and where the bank itself does not wish
to pay pending an adjudication of the rights and obligations
of the other parties....
36 Id. at 634-35 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
37 Id. at 635.
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On this motion only the complaint is before me and I am
bound by its allegation that the Chartered Bank is not a
holder in due course but is a mere agent for collection for
the account of the seller charged with fraud. Therefore, the
Chartered Bank's motion to dismiss the complaint must be
denied. If it had appeared from the face of the complaint that the
bank presenting the draft for payment was a holder in due course,
its claim against the bank issuing the letter of credit would not be
defeated even though the primary transaction was tainted with
fraud.38
5.3. Commentary
When Sztejn is compared with the other cases previously dis-
cussed, it is not surprising that the case is universally regarded as
the seminal case in the development of the fraud rule. Sztejn is a
case not only where the facts are typical, but also where the plead-
ings and the judgment provide clear guidance for future cases in-
volving letter of credit fraud. Unlike earlier cases, Sztejn was both
pleaded and decided on the principles of the law of letters of
credit, not the law of contracts. Sztejn shows how a frustrated ap-
plicant who has been defrauded by a dishonest beneficiary can rely
on the fraud rule to protect its interest.
More importantly, Sztejn was the first case to enunciate the ma-
jor elements of the fraud rule. It declared three principles of para-
mount importance. First, payment under a letter of credit may
only be interrupted in a case of fraud; mere allegation of breach of
warranty cannot be an excuse for such an interruption. Second,
payment under a letter of credit can only be interrupted when
fraud is proven or established; mere allegation of fraud should not
be an excuse for such an interruption. Third, payment should be
made in accordance with the terms of the credit, notwithstanding
the existence of the proven fraud, if a holder in due course or a
presenter with similar status makes demand for payment.
39
However, it should be noted that because Sztejn involved a mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint and all allegations of the complaint
were assumed to be true, entire issues such as the extent and onus
38 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
39 Id. at 634-35.
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of proof and the standard or degree of fraud in the application of
the fraud rule were avoided. Those untouched issues comprise the
limits of the case and have reverberated throughout the subse-
quent development of the fraud rule both in and outside the
United States.
6. THE FRAUD RULE IN THE UNITED STATES
The fraud rule laid down in Sztejn has been codified in Article 5
of the U.C.C., so the relevant provisions of Article 5 of the U.C.C.
ought to be considered first whenever the current fraud rule in the
United States is examined.
6.1. The Previous Version of Article 5
In the previous (initial) version of U.C.C. Article 5, the fraud
rule was embodied in Section 5-114(2), which read:
Unless otherwise agreed when documents appear on their
face to comply with the terms of a credit but a required
document does not in fact conform to the warranties made
on negotiation or transfer of a document of title (Section 7-
507) or of a certificated security (Section 8-108) or is forged
or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction:
(a) the issuer must honor the draft or demand for pay-
ment if honor is demanded by a negotiating bank or
other holder of the draft or demand which has taken the
draft or demand under the credit and under circum-
stances which would make it a holder in due course
(Section 3-302) and in an appropriate case would make
it a person to whom a document of title has been duly
negotiated (Section 7-502) or a bona fide purchaser of a
certificated security (Section 8-302); and
(b) in all other cases as against its customer, an issuer
acting in good faith may honor the draft or demand for
payment despite notification from the customer of
fraud, forgery or other defect not apparent on the face
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of the documents but a court of appropriate jurisdiction
may enjoin such honor.40
Section 5-114(2) was basically a restatement of the spirit of
Sztejn, but, from the viewpoint of the development of the fraud
rule, codifying the fraud rule in the U.C.C. was far more significant
in several respects than the decision in Sztejn would have been by
itself.
In the first place, the U.C.C. in a statute clearly told victims of
letter of credit fraud that they could effectively protect their inter-
est by using the weapon of the fraud rule. They no longer had to
structure their cases using other principles, such as the law of con-
tracts (as in the case of Higgins), or by saying that the documents
were non-conforming (as in the case of Old Colony).
Second, Section 5-114(2)(b) indicated that the fraud rule could
be applied in two settings, something not shown in early cases, in-
cluding Sztejn: (1) a court of competent jurisdiction could enjoin an
issuer from honoring a letter of credit if "documents appear on
their face to comply with the terms of a credit but a required
document.., is forged.., or there is fraud in the transaction;" and
(2) the issuer could ("may") voluntarily invoke the fraud rule and
refuse to honor a draft or demand for payment if fraud as above
was brought to its attention.41
40 U.C.C. § 5-114(2) (1952) (prior to 1995 revision). Prior U.C.C. Article 5, Sec-
tions 114(1) and 114(3), emphasized the principle of independence and the issuer's
entitlement for reimbursement after honor, reading, respectively:
(1) An issuer must honor a draft or demand for payment which complies
with the terms of the relevant credit regardless of whether the goods or
documents conform to the underlying contract for sale or other contract
between the customer and the beneficiary. The issuer is not excused
from honor of such a draft or demand by reason of an additional general
term that all documents must be satisfactory to the issuer, but an issuer
may require that specified documents must be satisfactory to it.
(3) Unless otherwise agreed an issuer which has duly honored a draft or
demand for payment is entitled to immediate reimbursement of any
payment made under the credit and to be put in effectively available
funds not later than the day before maturity of any acceptance made un-
der the credit.
41 Id. sec. (2)(a), cmt. 2. But the issuer is not obliged to do so. For a succinct
summary of the reasons, see Wolfgang Freiherr von Marschall, Recent Develop-
ments in the Fields of Standby Letters of Credit, Bank Guarantees and Performance
Bonds, in CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE FINANcING 260, 275-82 (C.
M. Chinkin ed., 1983). In practice, banks are more likely to pay than to refuse to
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Third, this codification, notwithstanding its modest form,
played a very important role in the harmonization and unification
of the fraud rule in the law of letters of credit. After promulgation,
Section 5-114(2) was cited and utilized by courts and letter of credit
users in the United States on a regular basis, served as a good uni-
form guideline to parties dealing with letter of credit fraud dis-
putes, and in many areas unified earlier divergent practices.
Finally, as a result of codifying the case law into a statute, the
position of the fraud rule was strengthened in the law of letters of
credit. The promulgation of Section 5-114(2) has greatly fostered
study of the fraud rule, a fact illustrated by a greatly increased vol-
ume of case law on letter of credit fraud42 and by much more
commentary on the fraud rule worldwide.43 In fact, it may be that
its influence has been even greater in civil law countries than in
common law countries, as civil law countries normally look to
statutes rather than cases in seeking sources of law.44
pay because doing the latter may damage their biggest asset-reputation. In
many cases they even oppose applicants' applications for injunction, because "by
obtaining an injunction restraining the bank from honouring that undertaking, he
[the applicant] will undermine what is the bank's greatest asset, however large
and rich it may be, namely its reputation for financial and contractual probity."
Bolivinter Oil S.A. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 1 Lloyd's Rep. 251, 257 (C.A. 1984)
(Sir John Donaldson, M.R.).
42 A good source for case law with respect to the development of the fraud
rule is the annual survey for letter of credit cases published by the Institute of In-
ternational Banking Law and Practice. See, e.g., INsTrtrE oF INTERNATIONAL
BANKING LAW & PRACTICE, INC., ANNUAL SURVEY OF LErrE OF CREDIT LAW AND
PRAcTIcE Games E. Byrne ed., 1996). These surveys, compiled by U.S. letters of
credit experts, are about letters of credit cases handed down in the previous year
by U.S. courts. They include not only the number of cases decided, but also dis-
cuss different types of cases and provide brief comments on the cases.
43 A great deal has been written about the fraud rule since the promulgation
of Article 5 of the U.C.C. There is too much written work to be listed here. Ac-
cording to Professor Byrne, the treatment of fraud in Article 5 of the U.C.C. inter-
ested the letter of credit community worldwide although the Article itself as a
whole failed to do so. James E. Byrne, The Revision of U.C.C. Article 5: A Strategy
for Success, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 16 (1990). As noted in Robert S. Rendell, Fraud
and Injunctive Relief, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 111, 117 (1990), "The fraud doctrine as em-
bodied in U.C.C. Section 5-114(2) is one of the most important provisions in article
5.,,
44 For example, in China, the whole U.C.C. has been translated into Chinese,
and many people in the legal profession regard it as a good reference for modern
commercial law. But relatively few foreign cases have been translated into Chi-
nese. There are at least three reasons for this: (1) China is a civil law country,
where cases are not regarded as law, so people in China naturally think much less
of cases than of statutes; (2) the sheer volume of case law mitigates against transla-
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Nonetheless, the previous version of Article 5 was drafted
more than forty years ago, and as a basis for future development.
45
The provisions of Section 5-114(2) were not entirely faultless, and
in some cases even led to confusion among courts and letter of
credit users. For example, Section 5-114(2) failed to mention what
constituted fraud under the fraud rule, so different standards of
fraud were subsequently applied in different cases. Further, Sec-
tion 5-114(2) provided that the fraud rule should be applied
"when... a required document... is forged or fraudulent" or
when "there is fraud in the transaction ...." Separating these two
issues led to unnecessary confusion about where fraud needed to
be located. In addition, Section 5-114(2) named three types of par-
ties that might be immune from the fraud rule: (a) a "holder in due
course" stipulated in Section 3-302 of the U.C.C.; (b) a holder of a
document of title duly negotiated according to Section 7-502 of the
U.C.C.; and (c) a "bona fide purchaser of a certificated security"
under Section 8-302 of the U.C.C. In fact, only the type of parties
named in (a), a "holder in due course," has proven to be relevant to
the application of the fraud rule.
46
6.2. Revised U.C.C. Article 5
Along with the whole of Article 5, Section 5-114(2) was thor-
oughly revised in 1995 to cure the "weaknesses, gaps, and errors in
the original statute which compromise its relevance" 47 and to meet
tion; and (3) learning an area of foreign law from scattered cases is technically
much more difficult than studying a statute.
45 See U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. (1952) (prior to 1995 revision) (stating that the arti-
cle is intended "to set an independent theoretical frame for the further develop-
ment of letters of credit"); Note, Letters of Credit: Injunction as a Remedy for Fraud in
U.C.C. Section 5-114, 63 MINN. L. REv. 487, 493 n.27 (1979) (noting the drafters of
the article "felt that no statute could effectively or wisely codify the law of letters
of credit without hampering development of the device").
46 According to the investigation of the Task Force formed for the revision of
Article 5: "There are no cases applying U.C.C. Articles 7 or 8 in the context of Sec-
tion 5-114." Task Force on the Study of U.C.C. Article 5, An Examination of U.C.C.
Article 5 (Letters of Credit), 45 Bus. LAW 1521, 1621 (1990) [hereinafter Task Force
Report]. For a discussion about Section 7-507 of the U.C.C. under the context of
Section 5-114(2), see Kerry L. Macintosh, Letters of Credit: Dishonor When a Required
Document Fails to Conform to the Section 7-507(b) Warranty, 6 J.L. & CoM. 1, 1-2
(1986) (arguing that a required document's "failure... to conform to any one of
the three transfer warranties .. justifies dishonor").
47 Task Force Report, supra note 46, at 1532.
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the challenges of the constant development of letters of credit.48
The fraud rule is now embodied in Article 5, Section 5-109, which
reads:
(a) If a presentation is made that appears on its face strictly
to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of
credit, but a required document is forged or materially
fraudulent, or honor of the presentation would facilitate a
material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or applicant:
(1) the issuer shall honor the presentation, if honor is
demanded by (i) a nominated person who has given
value in good faith and without notice of forgery or ma-
terial fraud, (ii) a confirmer who has honored its con-
firmation in good faith, (iii) a holder in due course of a
draft drawn under the letter of credit which was taken
after acceptance by the issuer or nominated person, or
(iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's
deferred obligation that was taken for value and with-
out notice of forgery or material fraud after the obliga-
tion was incurred by the issuer or nominated person;
and
(2) the issuer, acting in good faith, may honor or dis-
honor the presentation in any other case.
(b) If an applicant claims that a required document is
forged or materially fraudulent or that honor of the presen-
tation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary
on the issuer or applicant, a court of competent jurisdiction
may temporarily or permanently enjoin the issuer from
48 Articles of the U.C.C. are revised by a drafting committee specifically ap-
pointed for the task by the two sponsoring organizations of the U.C.C.: the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and the American
Law Institute. For a list of the jurisdictions that have adopted Revised Article 5,
see National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts
about the UCC Article 5-Letters of Credit, at http://www.nccusl.org
/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uccaS.asp (last visited Oct. 30,
2002); and Legal Information Institute, Uniform Commercial Code Locator, Article
5: Letters of Credit, at http://www.law.comell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a5 (last
visited Oct. 30, 2002).
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honoring a presentation or grant similar relief against the
issuer or other persons only if the court finds that:
(1) the relief is not prohibited under the law applicable
to an accepted draft or deferred obligation incurred by
the issuer;
(2) a beneficiary, issuer, or nominated person who may
be adversely affected is adequately protected against
loss that it may suffer because the relief is granted;
(3) all of the conditions to entitle a person to the relief
under the law of this State have been met; and
(4) on the basis of the information submitted to the
court, the applicant is more likely than not to succeed
under its claim of forgery or material fraud and the per-
son demanding honor does not qualify for protection
under subsection (a)(1).49
Compared with the previous version of Article 5, Section 5-
114(2), Revised U.C.C. Article 5, Section 5-109, has fine-tuned the
fraud rule in a number of areas.50 First, Section 5-109 has expressly
declared that, when fraud is found, the normal operation of a letter
of credit may be disrupted in two different ways: by the issuer's
refusing to honor a presentation,51 or by the applicant's asking a
court to enjoin the payment or presentation.52 Second, Section 5-
109 has tackled one of the most controversial issues raised in the
application the fraud rule since the promulgation of the previous,
49 U.C.C. § 5-109 (1952) (revised 1995).
50 The text of Section 5-109 also demonstrates how succinctly most of the
common law restrictions on the issuance of injunctions can be expressed in codi-
fied form. Id.
51 Id. § 5-109(a)(2) (1952) (revised 1995); U.C.C. § 5-109 cmt. 2 (1952) (revised
1995).
52 U.C.C. § 5-109(b) (1952) (revised 1995). There is no obligation upon the is-
suer to refuse to honor a letter of credit simply at the request of the applicant. The
applicant's primary remedy is to seek an injunction restraining honors by the is-
suer, as their potential liability for wrongful dishonor will presumably make most
issuers rather keen to honor a letter of credit unless restrained by a court.
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initial version of U.C.C. Article 5: the standard of fraud. Section 5-
109 provides that, to invoke the fraud rule, the fraud involved has
to be "material." Third, Section 5-109(a)(1) lists four types of par-
ties who may be immune from the fraud rule:
(i) a nominated person who has given value in good faith
and without notice of the fraud;5 3
(ii) a confirmer who has honoured its confirmation in good
faith;54
(iii) a holder in due course of a draft drawn under the letter
of credit which was taken after acceptance by the issuer or
nominated person;55 or
(iv) an assignee of the issuer's or nominated person's de-
ferred obligation that was taken for value and without no-
tice of forgery or material fraud after the obligation was in-
curred by the issuer or nominated person.5 6
Unlike the previous version of Section 5-114(2), which named
three groups of parties who should be protected under the fraud
rule, only one of which proved to be relevant, all four groups
named under Revised U.C.C. Article 5, Section 5-109 are relevant
to the fraud rule, a great improvement.
53 Id. § 5-109(a)(1)(i).
54 Id. § 5-109(a)(1)(ii).
55 Id. § 5-109(a)(1)(iii). It should be noted that the requirements specified in
Revised U.C.C. Article 5 to render a holder in due course immune from the fraud
rule are different from those mentioned in Prior U.C.C. Article 5. While a holder
in due course under Prior U.C.C. Article 5 might be a negotiating bank or any
other holder of a draft or demand who could meet the requirements for a holder
in due course stipulated in Section 3-302 of the U.C.C., a holder in due course un-
der Revised U.C.C. Article 5 should be a holder of a draft taken after acceptance
by the issuer or nominated person. Compared with Prior U.C.C. Article 5, Re-
vised U.C.C. Article 5 has narrowed the scope of immunity for parties who are
holders in due course. In other words, to be entitled to the immunity two condi-
tions have to be met: (1) the party must qualify as a holder in due course under
the terms set forth in Article 3 of the U.C.C.; and (2) the draft must have been ac-
cepted by the issuer or nominated person.
56 Id. § 5-109(a)(1)(iv).
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Finally, Section 5-109(b) has specified four conditions that must
be met when a court considers an injunction. They are intended to
reduce the frequency with which the fraud rule has been used
since the late 1970s and signal that the "standard for injunctive re-
lief is high" under Revised U.C.C. Article 5.57 Revised U.C.C. Arti-
cle 5, Section 5-109 now stands as the most comprehensive code of
the fraud rule in the law of letters of credit in the common law
world.
7. THE FRAUD RULE IN OTHER JURISDICIONS
The fraud rule has been recognized and upheld in most juris-
dictions, generally with explicit reference to, and adoption of, the
U.S. decision in Sztejn. The approach of the courts of the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia towards the fraud rule will be
considered.
7.1. United Kingdom
The most well-known English case on the fraud rule is United
City Merchants (Investments) Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada, where
payment of a letter of credit was refused when the bill of lading
presented had been fraudulently pre-dated by a third party.
58 The
beneficiary sued for wrongful refusal to honor the letter of credit.
Before considering the issue of third-party fraud, Lord Diplock
stated:
To this general statement of principle [of independence] ...
there is one established exception: that is, where the seller,
for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently pre-
sents to the confirming bank documents that contain, ex-
pressly or by implication, material representations of fact
that to his knowledge are untrue. Although there does not
appear among the English authorities any case in which
this exception has been applied, it is well established in the
57 U.C.C. § 5-109 cmt. 4 (1952) (revised 1995).
58 1 Lloyd's Rep. 267 (Q.B. 1979) (Mocatta, J.) (holding there was not suffi-
cient evidence of fraud); affd 1 Lloyd's Rep. 604 (Eng. C.A. 1981) (holding that
beneficiaries were innocent of a third party's fraud); affd 1983 A.C. 168 (H.L. 1982)
(Lord Diplock) (emphasizing that a beneficiary is not liable for fraud perpetrated
by third parties).
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American cases of which the leading or "landmark" case is
Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corporation.59
As this quotation shows, 60 Sztejn is the "foundation stone of
English law in this area ..... 61 However, although the fraud rule
is recognized in the United Kingdom, it has not often been applied.
The English courts have traditionally been very reluctant to inter-
fere with the operation of a letter of credit and have adopted a rela-
tively inflexible and narrow approach towards the application of
the fraud rule. The well-known statement of Lord Justice Jenkins
in Hamzeh Malas & Sons v. British Imex Industries Ltd. explains the
reason:
[I]t seems to be plain enough that the opening of a con-
firmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the
banker and the vendor of the goods, which imposes upon
the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any
dispute there may be between the parties as to whether the
goods are up to contract or not. An elaborate commercial
system has been built up on the footing that bankers' con-
firmed credits are of that character, and, in my judgment, it
would be wrong for this court in the present case to inter-
fere with that established practice.... That system...
would break down completely if a dispute as between the
vendor and the purchaser was to have the effect of "freez-
ing," if I may use that expression, the sum in respect of
which the letter of credit was opened.62
Sticking to the general non-interference approach, English
courts have saddled plaintiffs with a great burden of proof, requir-
59 1983 A.C. 168,183 (H.L. 1982) (Lord Diplock).
60 The other oft-cited passage in this regard is from Lord Justice Denning in
Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd., 1 All E.R. 976, 981
(C.A. 1977), where he said: "To this general principle [of independence] there is an
exception in the case of what is called established or obvious fraud to the knowl-
edge of the bank. The most illuminating case is of Sztejn v. I Henry Schroder Bank-
ing Corp ......
61 RAYMOND JACK ET AL., DOCUMENTARY CREDIS 260 (3d ed. 2001).
62 2 Q.B. 127,129 (1958).
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ing them to establish the existence of "clear" or "obvious" fraud
known to the issuer in order to invoke the fraud rule.
63
The difficulty of meeting this high standard of proof in the
English courts is well demonstrated by the first English case to cite
Sztejn with approval: Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd.64
In that case, the plaintiff, an English buyer, contracted with a
French company, Promodisc, to buy 8625 discs and 825 cassettes.
The buyer instructed the defendant to issue a documentary credit
in favor of the seller. The seller shipped goods purporting to be
those ordered, and presented the draft with documents regular on
their face to the confirming bank in Paris, which the bank ac-
cepted.65
When the goods arrived, the buyer inspected the goods in the
presence of a representative of the issuer. The inspection revealed
that:
[T]here were 94 cartons, but of these two were empty, five
were filled with rubbish or packing, twenty-five of the re-
cords boxes and three of the cassette boxes were only partly
filled, and two boxes labelled as cassettes were filled with
records; instead of 825 cassettes, as ordered, there were
only 518 cassettes and 25 cartridges. Out of the 518 cas-
settes delivered, 75 percent were not as ordered.., out of
the 8,625 records ordered, only 275 were delivered as per
order. The rest were not as ordered and were either rejects
or unsaleable. 66
63 In R D Harbottle (Mercantile) Ltd. v. National Westminister Bank Ltd., 2 All
E.R. 862, 870 (Q.B. 1977), Judge Kerr states:
It is only in exceptional cases that the courts will interfere with the machin-
ery of irrevocable obligations assumed by banks. They are the life-blood
of international commerce. Such obligations are regarded as collateral to
the underlying rights and obligations between the merchants at either
end of the banking chain. Except possibly in clear cases of fraud of which
the banks have notice, the courts will leave the merchants to settle their
disputes under the contracts by litigation or arbitration as available to
them or stipulated in the contracts.... Otherwise, trust in international
commerce could be irreparably damaged. (emphasis added).
64 1 All E.R. 1071 (Ch. 1974).
65 Id. at 1072-73.
66 Id. at 1073.
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Relying upon Sztejn, the buyer attempted to enjoin the issuer
from honoring the seller's drafts drawn upon the letter of credit,
alleging that the seller was guilty of fraud. Judge Megarry of the
Chancery Division rejected the buyer's claim, distinguished the
case from Sztejn, and said:
[I]t is important to notice that in the Sztejn case the proceed-
ings consisted of a motion to dismiss the formal complaint
on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action. That be-
ing so, the court had to assume that the facts stated in the
complaint were true. The complaint alleged fraud, and so
the court was dealing with a case of established fraud. In
the present case there is, of course, no established fraud, but
merely an allegation of fraud. The defendants, who were not
concerned with that matter, have understandably adduced
no evidence on the issue of fraud. Indeed, it seems unlikely
that any action to which Promodisc was not a party would
contain the evidence required to resolve this issue. Accord-
ingly, the matter has to be dealt with on the footing that this
is a case in which fraud is alleged but has not been estab-
lished.67
In this case, the buyer obtained its evidence in the presence of a
third party, the issuer, showing that a great proportion of the
shipment was either rubbish or empty cartons. It was striking to
hear that the court found there was "no established fraud, but
merely an allegation of fraud."68 With this approach, obtaining an
injunction to prevent the payment of a letter of credit is practically
impossible in most cases in England, despite English courts' claims
that they "will not allow their process to be used by a dishonest
person to carry out a fraud." 69
However, some of the more recent decisions have indicated
that the English courts might have started to move away from this
rigid non-interference approach. In Themehelp Ltd. v. West,70 the
plaintiffs agreed to purchase the defendants' share capital in a
67 Id. at 1074 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
63 Id.
69 United City Merchs. (Invs.), Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Can., 1983 A.C. 168, 184
(1982).
70 4 All E.R. 215 (C.A. 1995).
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company which owned the trading assets of Shinecrest, whose
main business activity was the manufacture of stands for television
sets. The purchase price was negotiated on the basis of profit pro-
jections prepared on an assumption that demand from a major cus-
tomer of the business, Sony, would continue. Part of the purchase
price was payable upon completion of the contract, and the balance
by subsequent installments at stipulated dates. The third (and the
largest) installment was secured by a performance guarantee
(which, for these purposes, is the legal equivalent of a letter of
credit).
After the first two installments had been paid, the plaintiffs
"started proceedings for rescission of the contract and damages on
the ground of alleged fraudulent misrepresentation by" the defen-
dants.71 The buyers claimed that the sellers had concealed impor-
tant information about the business, having "become aware by the
date of execution of the agreement that there was no longer any
basis" for the assumption used for calculating the purchase price,
because Sony "had decided to order all future supplies... from a
competitor of the sellers." 72 In the proceedings, the buyers applied
for an injunction "to restrain the sellers from giving notice to the
guarantors [to enforce the guarantee] until the trial. ... "73 The in-
junction was granted on the ground that "the evidence was suffi-
cient to raise a seriously arguable case at trial that the only reason-
able inference which could be drawn from the circumstances was
that the sellers were fraudulent." 74 The Court of Appeals affirmed
the sellers' appeal.75
71 Id. at 218.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted that it was also stated that this
,case was exceptional, in that here the relief was sought at an earlier stage -that is
to say a restraint against the beneficiary alone in proceedings to which the guaran-
tor is not a party, to prevent the exercise by the beneficiary of his power to enforce
the guarantee .... " Id. at 225. A similar approach was once also suggested in an
earlier case, United Trading Corp. v. Allied Arab Bank Ltd., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 554, 561
(C.A. 1984), where Lord Justice Ackner of the Court of Appeal stated:
We would expect the Court to require strong corroborative evidence of
the allegation, usually in the form of contemporary documents, particu-
larly those emanating from the buyer.... If the Court considers that on
the material before it the only realistic inference to draw is that of fraud,
then the seller would have made out a sufficient case of fraud.
75 The affirmation was given by two to one: Lord Justice Waite delivered the
judgment, Lord Justice Balcombe agreed, and Lord Justice Evans dissented. For a
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None of the limited number of English cases where the fraud
rule has been applied involved actions brought by the applicant
against the bank. They are cases involving either actions against
the bank's refusal to honor a letter of credit, such as Banco
Santander SA v. Bayfern Ltd.,76 or actions against the beneficiary's
demand for payment, such as Themehelp.77 Hence it appears that
English courts have taken a different approach in cases where the
applicant takes an action against the issuer for an injunction pre-
venting it from honoring a letter of credit from cases where the
beneficiary takes an action against the issuer for wrongful refusal
to honor a letter of credit, or cases where the applicant takes an ac-
tion against the beneficiary to prevent it from demanding payment.
This seems to have been implied by Judge Megarry in Discount Re-
cords when he said, "The defendants [the issuers], who were not
concerned with that matter, have understandably adduced no evi-
dence on the issue of fraud. Indeed, it seems unlikely that any ac-
tion to which Promodisc [the beneficiary] was not a party would
contain the evidence required to resolve this issue,"78 and also to
have been supported by some commentators. For example, Profes-
sor Goode has commented:
A distinction must be drawn between the evidence required
to obtain an interlocutory injunction and the evidence nec-
essary to entitle a bank that has refused to pay to justify its
refusal in proceedings against it. In the latter case... all
that the bank has to show at the trial is that on a balance of
probabilities the beneficiary was guilty of fraud. In pro-
ceedings against the bank for an injunction, either the fraud
must be established or the evidence of it must be compel-
ling.79
special comment on the case, see Anthony Pugh-Thomas, Letters of Credit-
Injunctions - The Purist and the Pragmatist: Can a Buyer Bypass the Guarantor and Stop
the Seller from Demanding Payment from the Guarantor?, 11 J. INT'L BANKING L. 210
(1996).
76 2 All E.R. 18 (1999 Q.B.), affd, 1 All E.R. 776 (C.A. 2000).
77 Themehelp Ltd. v. West, 4 All E.R. 215 (C.A. 1995).
78 Discount Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd., 1 All E.R. 1071, 1074 (Ch.
1974).
79 Roy M. Goode, Reflections on Letters of Credit- I, 1980 J. Bus. L. 291,294.
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However, since the number of cases in which the fraud rule has
been applied is very small, it is too early to make such a conclusion
definitively.
It seems that no such distinction has been made in the United
States. This can be inferred from Official Comment 5 on Revised
U.C.C. Article 5, Section 5-109:
Although the statute deals principally with injunctions
against honor, it also cautions against granting "similar re-
lief" and the same principles apply when the applicant or
issuer attempts to achieve the same legal outcome by in-
junction against presentation... interpleader, declaratory
judgment, or attachment.8
0
7.2. Canada
In Canada, as in the U.K., Sztejn8l is regarded as the founda-
tional case in this area.82 In applying the fraud rule, the earlier
cases also followed the English line set out in Edward Owen83 in re-
quiring a clear and obvious fraud to invoke the fraud rule. In As-
pen Planners Ltd. v. Commerce Masonry & Forming Ltd.,84 the plaintiff
and the defendant entered into a contract to erect a building for the
plaintiff. Payment was to be made by installments through a
standby letter of credit on the account of the plaintiff against cer-
tificates of entitlement presented by the defendant. When partially
completed, the building collapsed. The plaintiff claimed damages
for breach of the building contract by the defendant, and sought a
declaration that the defendant was "not entitled to deliver further
certificates to obtain payment.., under the letters of credit and
80 U.C.C., § 5-109, official cmt. 5 (1952) (revised 1995).
81 Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroder Banking Corp., 31 N.Y.S.2d 631 (Special Term
1941).
82 In the leading Canadian case on the fraud rule, Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angel-
ica-Whitewear Ltd., [1987] D.L.R.4th 161, 177, Justice Le Dain of the Supreme Court
of Canada stated: "I think it is preferable, in the interests of the uniformity that is
so important in this area of the law, that we should follow the rule that was af-
firmed in Sztejn .... Id. at 177.
83 Edward Owen Eng'g Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Int'l Ltd., 1 All E.R. 976, 981
(C.A. 1977).
84 [1979] D.L.R.3d 546 (1979).
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should be enjoined from doing so, and that the bank should be en-
joined from making further payments to the" defendant.
85
No fraud was alleged in the case. But in dismissing the plain-
tiff's request for injunction, Judge Henry of the Ontario High Court
of Justice started his judgment by saying that "[t]he law respect-
ing... letters of credit has been developed principally in the
United Kingdom and is well settled."8 6 He then quoted heavily
from the English case of Edward Owen and decided that only "what
is called established or obvious fraud to the knowledge of the
bank" 87 in the transaction could justify an injunction for the pay-
ment of a letter of credit.
However, many of the Canadian courts have been less hesitant
to apply the fraud rule. They "have on the whole adopted the test
of a strong prima facie case of fraud"88 as applied by Judge Galli-
gan in C.D.N. Research & Developments Ltd. v. Bank of Nova Scotia.
89
In C.D.N. Research & Development, the plaintiff contracted to sell to
the Ministry of War of Iran five fire-fighting vehicles. Two letters
of credit were issued by the defendant in favor of the Ministry.
One of them was issued as a delivery guarantee. Long after the de-
livery was effected, a demand for payment under the letter of
credit was made. The plaintiff moved to enjoin the is-
suer/defendant from making payment of the letter of credit on the
basis that a call on the letter of credit would be fraudulent. Al-
though Judge Galligan of the Ontario High Court also quoted Lord
Denning's remark in Edward Owen as it appeared in Aspen Planners,
he granted the injunction by saying:
A good deal of argument was addressed to the issue of
whether or not fraud has been established by the plaintiff in
this case.... It seems, on the material before me, that there
can be no doubt that the five firefighting vehicles were de-
livered .... It is my opinion, in this case, an injunction
ought to be granted. In my view.., the plaintiff has made
out a strong prima facie case that the demand made by the
85 Id. at 546-47.
86 Id. at 549.
87 Id. (quoting Edward Owen Eng'g Ltd., 1 All E.R. at 981).
ss Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica Whitewear Ltd., [1987] D.L.R.4th 161, 174
(emphasis omitted).
89 18 C.P.C. 62 (1980).
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agent of the Ministry of War is fraudulent. Delivery has
clearly been made and claim for a payment of a delivery
guarantee necessarily implying that delivery was not made
is clearly untrue and false.90
In Bank of Nova Scotia v. Angelica-Whitewear Ltd.,91 at the request
of Whitewear Manufacturing Co. Ltd. ("Whitewear"), Bank of
Nova Scotia ("the Bank") opened an irrevocable negotiation letter
of credit in favor of Protective Clothing Company ("Protective") to
cover the purchase price of contracted garments. Before the pay-
ment of one of the invoices, Whitewear, the applicant, informed the
Bank, among others, that the signature on the inspection certificate
was forged and payment under the letter of credit should be with-
held. However, payment under the letter of credit was finally
made upon repeated demands by the negotiation bank, and the
applicant's account was debited. The issuer instituted an action
against the applicant for the balance owed. The applicant claimed
that the issuer was not entitled to debit its account, as it was not
obliged to pay because of prior knowledge of fraud by the benefi-
ciary. The applicant also alleged that the Bank was informed be-
fore payment was made that the prices in the invoice were fraudu-
lently inflated. The trial court found for the Bank. An appeal was
allowed and the court upheld the contention for fraud. The Bank
then appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court.92 Justice Le Dain
distinguished actions for interlocutory injunction before the issuer
pays the beneficiary from disputes between the issuer and the ap-
plicant after the issuer pays the beneficiary and stated:
I would draw a distinction between what must be shown
on an application for an interlocutory injunction to restrain
payment under a letter of credit on the ground of fraud by
the beneficiary of the credit and what must be shown, in a
case such as this one, to establish that a draft was improp-
erly paid by the issuing bank after notice of alleged fraud
by the beneficiary. A strong prima facie case of fraud would
90 Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
91 [1987] D.L.R.4th 161.
92 The appeal was dismissed, but on the basis of the application of the strict
compliance rule, which is outside the scope of this work, and will not be dis-
cussed further.
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appear to be a sufficient test on an application for an inter-
locutory injunction. Where, however, no such application
was made and the issuing bank has had to exercise its own
judgment as to whether or not to honour a draft, the test in
my opinion should be the one laid down in Edward Owen
Engineering-whether fraud was so established to the
knowledge of the issuing bank before payment of the draft
as to make the fraud clear or obvious to the bank.93
In conclusion, "[t]he judgment of the Court of Appeal allowing
Whitewear's appeal [could not], therefore, be supported on the
ground of fraud."94
This approach is similar to the approach taken by English
courts in the sense, as mentioned, that English courts take different
approaches to actions against different parties. Whereas, "Ameri-
can courts have generally not observed the distinction between
cases involving interlocutory injunctions and those arising after the
fact of payment."95
Before reaching that conclusion, the Court also considered the
following issues with respect to the application of the fraud rule:
whether the application of the fraud exception "should be confined
to cases of forged or false documents or whether it should extend
to fraud in the underlying [sale of goods] transaction;" whether the
application of the fraud exception "should be confined to fraud by
the beneficiary... , or whether it should include fraud by a third
party which affects the letter of credit transaction but of which the
beneficiary of the credit is innocent;" and whether "a holder in due
course of a draft" should be immune from the application of the
fraud rule.
96
After referring to Sztejn, relevant provisions of the previous
version of U.C.C. Article 5, Section 5-114(2), the French position
towards the fraud rule, and many cases decided in the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, the Court observed:
93 Bank of Nova Scotia, [1987] D.L.R.4th at 177 (first and third emphases
added).
94 Id. at 184.
93 John F. Dolan, Documentary Credit Fundamentals: Comparative Aspects, 3
BAN<,ING & FIN. L. REv. 121,130 (1989).
96 Bank of Nova Scotia, [1987] D.L.R.4th at 168.
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[T]he fraud exception to the autonomy of documentary let-
ters of credit should not be confined to cases of fraud in the
tendered documents but should include fraud in the under-
lying transaction of such a character as to make the demand
for payment under the credit a fraudulent one.... [T]he
fraud exception to the autonomy of a documentary credit
should extend to any act of the beneficiary of a credit the ef-
fect of which would be to permit the beneficiary to obtain
the benefit of the credit as a result of fraud. The fraud ex-
ception should be confined to fraud by the beneficiary of a
credit and should not extend to fraud by a third party of
which the beneficiary is innocent.... [T]he fraud exception
should not be opposable to the holder in due course of a
draft on a letter of credit. 97
Many aspects of the fraud rule were thoroughly considered in
this case, which has been appraised as "a scholarly decision,"98 and
"a lucid and comprehensive judgment setting out the Canadian
position to the exception." 99 However, it is a pity that one of the
most important issues with regard to the application of the fraud
rule - the kind of fraud that can invoke the fraud rule - was barely
mentioned in the case.
7.3. Australia
Sztejn and the fraud rule have also been recognized in Austra-
lia. The first Australian case to apply the fraud rule and cite Sztejn
with approval was Contronic Distributors Party Ltd. v. Bank of New
South Wales. 00 In that case, Contronic wished to purchase semi-
conductors from GEC, to whom it was already indebted for earlier
dealings. It suggested the use of a letter of credit, which would
cover both the existing indebtedness and the purchase price of the
goods that it wished to purchase. Contronic's business had been
financed from time to time by Balfour, which granted credit facili-
ties to Contronic by way of applying for letters of credit from the
Bank of New South Wales in favor of the suppliers. Balfour also
97 Id. at 176-77.
98 Dolan, supra note 95, at 122.
99 Greg Fellinger, Letters of Credit: The Autonomy Principle and the Fraud Excep-
tion, 1 J. BANKING FIN. L. & PRAc. 4, 21 (1990).
100 (1984) 3 N.S.W.L.R. 110.
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financed this transaction in the same way, but the financier did not
know that the letter of credit would also cover the earlier debt.
When the financier discovered the true state of affairs, it brought
proceedings to restrain the bank from paying against the letter of
credit, and to prevent GEC from presenting the documents. The
Supreme Court of New South Wales granted the injunction. Justice
Helsham of the Court started his judgment by saying: "It is said
that the English law in relation to this topic is not settled, but it
seems to me to be sufficiently settled to indicate that this Court can
and should make an order restraining the presentation of the pay-
ment against this letter of credit."'01 He then quoted from English
textbooks on the topic, and relied on the English case of Discount
Records Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd.,102 all of which cited Sztejn as the
authority of law in the area, and concluded:
[I]t seems to me that the law stated in the American deci-
sions reflects the law of England by reason of the deci-
sion.... In my view the law is perhaps now settled, and in
any event would establish that a seller can be restrained
from presenting a letter of credit for payment or having
payment made against it in the event that the documents
which are needed to require payment to be made are false
to the knowledge of the seller.10 3
So far, Australian cases on the fraud rule are limited. And
there has been no case such as Angelica-Whitewear that comprehen-
sively sets out the Australian position. Although Australian courts
have claimed, in cases such as Contronic, that they are following the
English position, they have required neither "clear" nor "obvious"
fraud to invoke the fraud rule, nor taken different approaches to-
wards actions against different parties.
1L Id. at 114.
102 1 All E.R. 1071 (Ch. 1974).
103 Contronic Distributors Pty. Ltd. (1984) 3 N.S.W.L.R. 110,116.
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8. THE FRAUD RULE IN INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
("ICC') RULES
8.1. Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits
("UCP")10 4 is silent with respect to the issue of fraud and the fraud
rule. The reason usually given for this lacuna is that it is not the
function of the UCP to regulate issues that are the proper province
of national law and national courts. "Both the content and the in-
terpretation of ICC uniform rules are influenced by the fact that
their function is to serve as rules of best banking practice, not rules
of law,"105 and the fraud issue is traditionally considered as "the
province of the applicable law and of the courts of the fo-
rum... "106 National laws should therefore deal with any injunc-
tive relief on the ground of fraud by the beneficiary. In other
words, although "[t]he ICC drafters are clearly aware of the fraud
issue," 10 7 they have deliberately left it out. 0 8
The inactive approach of the UCP has been applauded by some
commentators as a striking success. In their view, any effort to
formulate a uniform fraud rule by the ICC is unnecessary and
bound to fail, as the fraud rule is quite sensitive to local rules and
these rules vary among jurisdictions. They argue that the current
104 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND
PRACTICE FOR DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1951) (revised 1993) (I.C.C. Publication No.
500) [hereinafter UCP]. The UCP was initially published in 1933 and revised ver-
sions were issued in 1951, 1962, 1974, 1983, and 1993. The pattern of a revision
every decade, apparent in the above series of revisions, reflected the needs of
those times rather than a conscious policy, so there may well not be a new revi-
sion in 2004 or 2005. A Supplement to the UCP for electronic presentation (the
"eUCP") came into force as of April 1, 2002. The eUCP is not a revision to the
UCP and does not affect any of the matters addressed in this article. It simply fa-
cilitates the application of the UCP to electronic documents and other documents
presented electronically.
105 Roy Goode, Abstract Payment Undertakings and the Rules of the International
Chamber of Commerce, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 725, 727 (1995).
106 Id.
107 John F. Dolan, Commentary on Legislative Developments in Letter of Credit
Law: An Interim Report, 8 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 53, 63 (1993).
108 Katherine A. Barski, Letters of Credit: A Comparison of Article 5 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code and the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits,
41 Loy. L. REV. 735, 751 (1996) ("[T]he lack of a fraud provision in the U.C.P. indi-
cates that the intent of the drafters was to defer to local law on the fraud issue.").
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position of the UCP may "create[ ] an incentive for the various ju-
risdictions to fashion fraud rules that do not interfere with the
marketability of credits issued by the jurisdiction's banks."109
However, there are difficulties with this view. While it is cor-
rect that the UCP is technically not law, but rather a compilation of
accepted commercial practices, the reality is that the UCP is cur-
rently "incorporated into substantially all cross-border commercial
letters of credit, studied and observed by letter of credit bankers
and users worldwide, and treated as quasi-law in the many coun-
tries that have little or no statutory law governing letters of
credit."1 0 Indeed, an applicant seeking a letter of credit not subject
to the UCP anywhere in the world except in the United States
(where Article 5 of the U.C.C. provides the law) is likely to have a
fruitless search. The very success of the UCP in gaining worldwide
acceptance casts upon it the burdens that any law bears: to be fair
and equitable to all parties."' In short, its success means the UCP
has become the de facto law.112
A good commercial law is one that promotes commerce be-
cause it maximizes certainty and predictability for the commercial
community. To achieve this end, a law should give the best an-
swers it can give to problems that can be predicted. The UCP can-
not meet this standard without dealing with the fraud issue. The
drafters of the UCP know of the problem of fraud; nevertheless
they chose not to address it, leaving users of letters of credit with-
out any guidance in dealing with the fraud problems they might
encounter. This generates an unacceptable -because unneces-
sary- degree of uncertainty and unpredictability.
To make matters worse, local fraud rules are diverse and un-
clear. In such an environment, when a fraud case goes to court and
a decision is made, that decision is likely to be criticized by letter of
109 Id. See also Dolan, supra note 107, at 63 (noting the difficulty of codifying
the fraud issue and discussing why the ICC policy is successful).
110 James G. Barnes, Internationalization of Revised UCC Article 5 (Letters of
Credit), 16 Nw. J. INT'L L. &Bus. 215, 216 (1995).
Mn Ross P. Buckley, The 1993 Revision of the Uniform Customs and Practice for
Documentary Credits, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 265, 267-68 (1995) ("[Tlhe
UCP will be best served in the future by a broader representation of interested
parties in its revision process.").
112 Id. See also JOHN F. DOLAN, THE LAW OF LETERS OF CREDIT: COMMERCIAL
AND STANDBY CREDITS 4.04 n.76 (2d ed. 1991 & cumulative supp. 1995) ("The
drafters of the Uniform Customs consistently have protested that the Uniform
Customs are not law, but they cannot deny that the Customs have the force of
law.").
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credit experts for not complying with the practices of the letter of
credit community and for being detrimental to the commercial util-
ity of letters of credit. It is therefore ironic that when drafting the
UCP, some of those same letter of credit specialists said it is for the
courts to make the relevant rules.113 This is neither logical nor fair
to the courts.
Judges should be legal experts, but it is not practical to expect
every judge to be an expert in the law of the letter of credit or to
make good law within the short framework of time that a case is
before a court. The reality is that "[m]ost trial judges have had lit-
tle experience with letter of credit matters .... "-114 Therefore, it is
desirable for the drafters of the UCP, who are all well-known letter
of credit experts, to provide guidance on these issues.
As pointed out by the learned and notable expert, Professor
Clive Schmitthoff, some twenty years ago now: "It would be de-
sirable that the next revision of the Uniform Customs and Prac-
tice... should deal with this problem."115 It did not. Neither did
the following revision in 1993. But the incidence of fraudulent
practice that prompted Clive Schmitthoff's call, has, if anything, in-
creased in the past twenty years.
8.2. Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees
Unlike the UCP, the Uniform Rules for Contract Guarantees
("URCG") have attempted to tackle the issue of fraud, or in this
context the "unfair calling" of independent guarantees. Article 9 of
the URCG provides:
If a guarantee does not specify the documentation to be
produced in support of a claim or merely specifies only a
statement of claim by the beneficiary, the beneficiary must
submit:
113 The Working Group that prepared the latest revision of the UCP was the first
to include members other than bankers, in this case some bank lawyers and two law
professors. The parties served by documentary credits-exporters and importers-
are not directly represented in the drafting process. See John A. Spanogle, Jr., The
Arrival of International Private Law, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 477,492 (1992)
(discussing the use of a committee to resolve issues).
114 Task Force Report, supra note 46, at 1611.
115 Clive M. Schmitthoff, Export Trade, J. Bus. L. 319, 321 (1983).
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a) in the case of a tender guarantee, his declaration that
the principal's tender has been accepted and that the
principal has then either failed to sign the contract or
has failed to submit a performance guarantee as pro-
vided for in the tender, and his declaration of agree-
ment, addressed to the principal, to have any dispute on
any claim by the principal for payment to him by the
beneficiary of all or part of the amount paid under the
guarantee settled by a judicial or arbitral tribunal as
specified in the tender documents or, if not so specified
or otherwise agreed upon, by arbitration in accordance
with the Rules of the ICC Court of Arbitration or with
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, at the option of the
principal;
b) in the case of a performance guarantee or of a re-
payment guarantee, either a court decision or an arbitral
award justifying the claim, or approval of the principal
in writing to the claim and the amount to be paid.1 6
Strictly speaking, these provisions are not the same as the fraud
rule under discussion. The fraud rule is concerned with the cir-
cumstances under which payment under a letter of credit may be
disrupted. Article 9 of the URCG provides the conditions that
trigger the payment of independent guarantees.
Nonetheless, the purpose of the fraud rule and this article of
the URCG is the same: the prevention of fraud. Unfortunately, the
URCG has been accepted by few users of independent guaran-
tees.117
116 INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ICC UNIFORM RuLEs FOR
CONTRACT GuARANTEEs art. 9 (1978) [hereinafter URCGI.
117 The URCG has rarely been accepted or used since its publication. One
reason is a conceptual problem in that the URCG has not made clear that it is con-
fined to independent guarantees and does not apply to accessory guarantees (the
more usual secondary guarantee of a liability). But the major hurdle to the gen-
eral acceptance of the URCG is because of the provision in Article 9, as it requires
the beneficiary to produce a judgment or arbitral award or the principal's written
approval when making a claim. The condition is designed to deal with the prob-
lem of unfair calling, but, in the words of Roy Goode, the URCG "proved too far
removed from the market practice," as it virtually turns independent guarantees
into accessory ones. Roy Goode, The New LC.C. Uniform Rules for Demand Guaran-
tees, 1992 LLoYD's MAR. & COM. L. Q. 190,190 (1992).
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8.3. Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees
Having learned from the experience of the URCG, the drafters
of the Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (URDG) chose to
take a similar position to the UCP on the issue of fraud, i.e., be si-
lent and leave it to the courts of the various jurisdictions.
Divergent views, however, were expressed during the formula-
tion of the rules, reflecting the competing interests of the parties
concerned. Banks sought a simple mechanism whereby the issuer
would have to pay without having to make difficult investigations
or take hard decisions based on unclear evidence. Beneficiaries at
large claimed that they needed a mechanism whereby they would
get paid against a simple demand or document without risking ob-
scure objections. Applicants were interested in having some kind
of safety device in the system so as to prevent unjustified call-
ings.118 Out of all this, in order to prevent the beneficiary's out-
right unjustified calling, Article 20 of the URDG implicitly goes
some small way towards putting restrictions on the beneficiary's
right of payment, saying:
Any demand for payment under the Guarantee shall be in
writing and shall (in addition to such other documents as
may be specified in the Guarantee) be supported by a writ-
ten statement (whether in the demand itself or in a separate
document or documents accompanying the demand and re-
ferred to in it) stating:
that the Principal is in breach of his obligation(s) under
the underlying contract(s) or, in the case of tender guar-
antee, the tender conditions; and
the respect in which the Principal is in breach.
Any demand under the Counter-Guarantee shall be sup-
ported by a written statement that the Guarantor has re-
ceived a demand for payment under the Guarantee in ac-
cordance with its terms and with this Article.
118 Lars Gorton, Draft UNCITRAL Convention on Independent Guarantees, J. Bus.
L., 240, 244 (1997).
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Paragraph (a) of this Article applies except to the extent that
it is expressly excluded by the terms of the Guarantee.
Paragraph (b) of this Article applies except to the extent
that it is expressly excluded by the terms of the Counter-
Guarantee."19
As can be seen, Article 20 of the URDG requires the beneficiary
when demanding payment to state in writing both that there is
some kind of breach of the underlying transaction and what type
of breach is involved, thus giving the other parties some kind of
protection by providing a ground for a claim of fraud. This puts
on the beneficiary a certain obligation to show its hand.120 How-
ever, this provision is similar to that of Article 9 of the URCG in na-
ture, in providing a kind of safety device for the trigger of the
payment of the independent guarantee to prevent fraud, but it dif-
fers from the fraud rule under discussion, which addresses what to
do when fraud is found to have been committed. As the URDG is
not yet well accepted by users of independent guarantees, the ef-
fectiveness of this approach remains to be seen.
8.4. International Standby Practices
The International Standby Practices ("ISP98") takes a similar
approach to the UCP and expressly leaves "defences to honour
based on fraud, abuse, or similar matters.., to applicable law."12'
119 URDG supra note 116, art. 20.
120 Gorton, supra note 118, at 249.
121 INTERNATIONAL STANDBY PRACrICEs, R. 1.05(c) (1998).
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Under Rules 4.16122 and 4.17123 of ISP98, a demand for payment
under a standby letter of credit is not required to indicate a default
or other event in the underlying transaction if that is not required
under the terms and conditions of the standby letter of credit. This
is a step back from the position of the URDG, in which the benefi-
ciary is required to state that there is a breach of the underlying
transaction and what type of breach is involved.
The omission of the fraud rule from ISP98 has nevertheless
been applauded by some commentators as "especially welcome,"
because fraud has been "addressed in different ways in different
countries. To have included provisions on fraud in the ISP would
probably have created needless complications in countries such as
the United States .... ,,124 However, as stated above, avoiding
problems may not be the best way to resolve them.
122 International Standby Practices Rule 4.16, entitled "Demand for Pay-
ment," provides:
A demand for payment need not be separate from the beneficiary's
statement or other required document.
If a separate demand is required, it must contain:
a demand for payment from the beneficiary directed to the issuer or
nominated person;
a date indicating when the demand was issued;
the amount demanded; and
the beneficiary's signature.
A demand may be in the form of a draft or other instruction, order, or
request for pay. If a standby requires presentation of a "draft" or "bill of
exchange," that draft or bill of exchange need not be in negotiable form
unless the standby so states.
Id. at R. 4.16.
123 International Standby Practices Rule 4.17, entitled "Statement of Default
or Other Drawing Event," provides:
If a standby requires a statement, certificate, or other recital of a default
or other drawing event and does not specify content, the document com-
plies if it contains:
a representation to the effect that payment is due because a drawing
event described in the standby has occurred;
a date indicating when it was issued; and
the beneficiary's signature.
Id. at R. 4.17
124 Paul S. Turner, New Rules for Standby Letters of Credit: The International
Standby Practices, 14 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 457, 463 (1999). Issues of fraud and
the fraud rule were considered when ISP98 was drafted: "A rule that would have
made the provisions of the United Nations Convention on Independent Guaran-
tees and Standby Letters of Credit applicable when the standby credit failed to
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9. THE FRAUD RULE UNDER THE UNCITRAL CONVENTION
Unlike the ICC rules, the Convention on Independent Guaran-
tees and Standby Letters of Credit ("Convention" or "UNCITRAL
Convention")125 made an effort to address the issue of fraud and to
prevent fraudulent or unjustified calling of standby letters of credit
or independent guarantees.126 There are three articles in relation to
the fraud rule under the Convention.
In Article 15, the Convention puts up a general requirement for
a beneficiary demanding payment under a letter of credit or inde-
pendent guarantee. Article 15(3) of the Convention provides that
"[t]he beneficiary, when demanding payment, is deemed to certify
that the demand is not in bad faith and that none of the elements
referred to in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of arti-
cle 19 are present."'127 Put another way, payment under a letter of
credit or independent guarantee has the potential to be disrupted if
the elements listed in Article 19 exist in the demand.
Article 19, entitled, "Exception to Payment Obligation," then
enumerates the circumstances under which the issuer may refuse
to honor the beneficiary's demand for payment. Paragraph (1) of
Article 19 provides that the guarantor/issuer has a right, as against
the beneficiary, to withhold payment if one of the following is
"manifest and clear": "Any document is not genuine or has been
falsified; no payment is due on the basis asserted in the demand
and the supporting documents; or Judging by the type and pur-
pose of the undertaking, the demand has no conceivable ba-
choose a jurisdictional law was wisely omitted at the very end of the drafting pro-
cess." Id. at 463 n.16.
125 United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby Let-
ters of Credit, Dec. 11, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 735 (1996) [hereinafter UNCYrRAL Conven-
tion].
126 However, this position has been criticized by some legal writers. See, e.g.,
Dolan, supra note 107, at 63 (arguing that UNCITRAL is "floundering" in its at-
tempt to confront the issue of fraud). The word "fraud" has not been used in the
Convention in order to avoid possible confusion resulting from different interpre-
tations developed in different jurisdictions about the meaning of the term. See
Eric E. Bergsten, A New Regime for International Independent Guarantees and Stand-
By Letters of Credit: The UNCITRAL Draft Convention on Guaranty Letters, 27 INT'L L.
859, 872 (1993) (contending that UNCITRAL have avoided the terms "fraud" and
"abuse of right").
127 UNCITRAL Convention, supra note 125, art. 15, para. 3.
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sis .... "12 Paragraph (2) of Article 19 explains what the phrase "no
conceivable basis" means, stating:
The contingency or risk against which the undertaking was
designed to secure the beneficiary has undoubtedly not ma-
terialised;
The underlying obligation of the principal/applicant has
been declared invalid by a court or arbitral tribunal, unless
the undertaking indicates that such contingency falls within
the risk to be covered by the undertaking;
The underlying obligation has undoubtedly been fulfilled
to the satisfaction of the beneficiary;
Fulfilment (sic) of the underlying obligation has clearly
been prevented by willful (sic) misconduct of the benefici-
ary; or
In the case of a demand under a counter-guarantee, the
beneficiary of the counter-guarantee has made payment in
bad faith as guarantor/issuer of the undertaking to which
the counter-guarantee relates. 129
Article 19 not only provides the issuer with some basis for re-
fusing payment, but also enables the applicant to take court meas-
ures against a fraudulent beneficiary. Paragraph (3) of the Article
provides that "[i]n the circumstances set out in subparagraphs (a),
(b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of this article, the principal/applicant is
entitled to provisional court measures in accordance with article
128 Id. art. 19, para. 1. Because the Article does not use the word "may" as
does Article 5 of the U.C.C., some commentators have suggested that it implies
certain duties on the guarantor to make a judgment whether the demand for
payment is warranted. See Gorton, supra note 118, at 249 (arguing that the lan-
guage of Article 19, paragraph 2 "implies a certain duty on the issuer to make a
judgment whether the requirements are met or not"). However, due to the nature
of letters of credit, the issuer should not be obliged to consider whether the de-
mand is justified or not, but should have the discretion to either honor a payment
when demanded or not.
129 UNCITRAL Convention, supra note 125, art. 19, para. 2.
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20."130 Article 20 of the Convention, with the heading of "Provi-
sional court measures," then lists the measures a court can take by
providing:
1. Where, on an application by the principal/applicant or
the instructing party, it is shown that there is a high prob-
ability that, with regard to a demand made, or expected to
be made, by the beneficiary, one of the circumstances re-
ferred to in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph I of
article 19 is present, the court, on the basis of immediately
available strong evidence, may:
a. Issue a provisional order to the effect that the benefi-
ciary does not receive payment, including an order that
the guarantor/issuer hold the amount of the undertak-
ing, or
b. Issue a provisional court order to the effect that the
proceeds of the undertaking paid to the beneficiary are
blocked, taking into account whether in the absence of
such an order the principal/applicant would be likely
to suffer serious harm.
2. The court, when issuing a provisional order referred to
in paragraph 1 of this article, may require the person apply-
ing therefor to furnish such form of security as the court
deems appropriate.
3. The court may not issue a provisional order of the kind
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article based on any objec-
tion to payment other than those referred to in subpara-
graphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of article 19, or use of
the undertaking for a criminal purpose.'
3 '
These provisions of the Convention are by and large in accor-
dance with current practice. They include most of the elements of
130 Id. art. 19, para. 3.
131 Id. art. 20.
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the fraud rule that have been developed over the years by national
courts and/or legislators and provide a detailed and helpful guide
to users of letters of credit and the courts. Like Revised U.C.C. Ar-
ticle 5, Section 5-109(b), the Convention has clearly spelled out
what kind of actions victims of fraud may take when fraud is
"manifest and clear" in a transaction of standby letters of credit or
independent guarantees, namely the issuer's refusal to honor a
presentation or withholding payment,132 and the applicant's enti-
tlement to a court injunction preventing the honoring of a presen-
tation by the issuer; 33 has listed what kind of misconduct may in-
voke the fraud rule; 34 has indicated that either fraud in the
documents or fraud in the underlying transaction may invoke the
fraud rule;135 and has provided necessary guidelines for courts
considering the application of the fraud rule.136
From a critical point of view, however, there are a few areas
that may need further improvement. First, one broad element of
the fraud rule is missing from the Convention: it fails to mention
who should be immune from the fraud rule, an important element
that should be considered whenever the fraud rule is applied so
that innocent third parties can be protected. Second, the influence
on the letter of credit world of the fraud rule as articulated in the
Convention may be affected by the fact that the Convention itself is
specifically designed to regulate standby letters of credit and inde-
pendent guarantees although commercial letter of credit users may
choose to use it if they so wish. 37 If the Convention were drafted
to cover all letters of credit, its influence might be much stronger.
However, the provisions regarding the fraud rule embodied in
the Convention signal a significant and encouraging development
in the area. First, the Convention is the initial document to provide
details of the fraud rule at an international level. Second, unlike
the ICC rules, which have to be incorporated into the letter of
credit as contractual terms to be effective, the Convention becomes
law in a country that signs and/or ratifies it. Finally, based on the
early signs, the influence of the Convention in the letter of credit
community ought not to be underestimated, because (1) it became
132 Id. art. 19, para. 1.
133 Id. art. 19, para. 3.
134 Id. art. 19, para. 1(a)-(c).
135 Id. art. 19 para. 1(a), (c).
136 Id. art. 20.
137 Id. art. 1, para. 2.
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effective less than five years after its promulgation; and (2) in the
list of signatory countries there are such important letter of credit
users as the United States.
10. CONCLUSION
The fraud rule is an integral part of the law governing letters of
credit and was developed to fill a gap in that law-to prevent un-
scrupulous beneficiaries from abusing the letter of credit system
and defrauding the applicant and the issuer.
The fraud rule is an extraordinary rule in the law of letters of
credit because it is in direct conflict with the fundamental principle
of the law of letters of credit-the principle of autonomy. Accord-
ingly, the fraud rule should be applied cautiously and confined
strictly to its purpose. Any broadening of the rule may destroy the
independence, and undermine the commercial utility, of the letter
of credit.
From the early cases considered to Revised U.C.C. Article 5 and
the UNCITRAL Convention, the development of the fraud rule has
come a long way. Now it has not only been recognized by virtu-
ally all jurisdictions but also has been codified in the UNCITRAL
Convention at the international level. Today Sztejn and its codifi-
cation in the U.C.C. are regarded as two milestones in the history
of the development of the fraud rule. One day the promulgation of
the fraud rule in the UNCITRAL Convention may well be consid-
ered as another leap forward along that path, formally lifting the
fraud rule from the national to the international level.
At present, however, the fraud rule is still a developing area
and the most important source of jurisprudence with respect to the
rule is to be found in Article 5 of the U.C.C. and the cases decided
thereunder.
The most regrettable fact in the course of development of the
fraud rule is that the rule is not included in the Uniform Customs
and Practice for Documentary Credits-the influential rules for let-
ters of credit that are incorporated by reference into virtually all
credits issued worldwide.
138
Courts in most jurisdictions outside the United States are inex-
perienced with letters of credit, and the litigation of fraud under
letters of credit is rare outside the United States. Accordingly,
there has been no opportunity elsewhere to develop a sophisti-
13s UCP, supra note 104.
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cated and coherent body of case law on the issue. 39 The proper
body to determine the extent of the fraud exception to the doctrine
of autonomy is the body with the expertise to do so, the publisher
of the UCP, the International Chamber of Commerce.
As the UCP is, in form, merely a set of contractual terms, what-
ever provisions it might include regarding fraud would be subor-
dinate to local law on the issue.140 However, there is no reason to
expect that courts would not give to UCP provisions on fraud the
same weight they have given to its other provisions. After all the
UCP prescribes the doctrine of autonomy,141 so why should it not
also prescribe the exception and limits to the doctrine?
To build the best legal system in a complex area like letters of
credit, experts need to exercise their expertise, make the hard deci-
sions, and draw up detailed rules to help ensure the smooth opera-
tion of the system.
It is hoped that in the next revision of the UCP, the revision
committee chooses to deal with the issue of fraud, and in doing so
takes its lead from the U.C.C. and the UNCITRAL Convention. If
the UCP embraces the law on fraud as set forth in Section 5-109 of
the U.C.C., as amplified by the definition of fraud from Article 19
of the UNCITRAL Convention, the result will be a highly workable
jurisprudence that will serve to enhance the commercial utility of
letters of credit and limit their use to perpetrate fraud. Given the
near universal acceptance and use of the UCP, for the fraud rule to
reach maturity the UCP needs to address the issue of fraud. Only
when the UCP deals with this issue will the international commer-
cial community enjoy a letter of credit system that appropriately
protects it against fraudsters; and only when the UCP proscribes
fraud will the journey that commenced with Lord Mansfield's
judgment in Pillans v. Van Mierop142 reach its end.
139 England has a sophisticated and well-developed jurisprudence on letter of
credit law in general, but not on the fraud issue in particular.
140 Robert Wight & Alan Ward, The Liability of Banks in Documentary Credit
Transactions Under English Law, 13 J. INT'L BANKING L. 387, 390 (1998).
141 See UCP, supra note 104, arts. 3 & 4 (defining the distinction between cred-
its and contracts and between documents and goods/services/performances).
142 97 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1765).
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